As child support debt owed nationally persists at alarming levels, both noncustodial parents and the custodial families who are not receiving support suffer significant hardships, and states are forced to expend greater resources on collection and enforcement efforts. This paper presents findings from an evaluation of a demonstration program developed to help noncustodial parents with large child support debts reduce their debt while simultaneously increasing child support paid to families, through gradual forgiveness of arrears conditional on payment of current child support obligations. The evaluation employs a randomized experimental design, nonexperimental analyses using propensity score matching and multilevel modeling techniques, and focus groups and follow-up interviews. Results show a pattern of effects that clearly suggests individuals responded to the program as intended. State child support debt balances decreased for program participants, and participants paid more toward their child support obligations and made more frequent child support payments. The study findings suggest considerable promise for the effectiveness of this program in reducing child support debt burdens and in increasing families' receipt of child support, and they also point to ways in which the implementation of the program can be improved.
INTRODUCTION
Despite recent policy efforts by federal and state governments to address the problem of nonpayment of child support, the amount of child support debt owed nationally, more than $105.5 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 (USDHHS, ACF, OCSE, 2009 ), remains at an alarming level. The fact that lowincome noncustodial parents (NCPs) owe a disproportionate share of this debt (in particular, public assistance debt owed to states) suggests that traditional collection and enforcement policies may not be adequate, and that much of the amount may ultimately prove "uncollectible" (Sorensen, 2004; Sorensen, Sousa & Schaner, 2007) . At the same time, child support debt presents significant hardships for noncustodial parents and custodial families who are not receiving support, as well as for states that expend resources on collection and enforcement efforts and face federal performance standard consequences for non-collection.
We present findings from an experimental and nonexperimental evaluation of a demonstration program, Families Forward, developed to help NCPs with large child support debts to reduce their debt levels while simultaneously increasing child support paid to families. The outcomes evaluated include: payments made toward current support obligations or debt, the frequency of payments made, and changes in state-owed and household (custodial parent) owed debt balances. Following a review of the literature on how child support debt accumulates, its consequences, and policy and program strategies developed to address this problem, we describe the distinctive features of the Families Forward debt reduction program and the samples and data used in the evaluation. We next discuss the experimental and nonexperimental methods employed in the evaluation and present findings from the analyses. The experimental analyses comparing those intending to receive treatment with the control group suggest responses by NCPs in the expected direction, although statistically significant impacts are not observed. Alternatively, nonexperimental analyses comparing actual participants to nonparticipants find statistically significant program effects in increasing NCPs' child support payments, increasing the frequency of payment, and reducing state-owed debt balances. We conclude with a discussion of changes in the program's implementation that could be made to improve program enrollment and effectiveness.
LITERATURE REVIEW How Child Support Debt Accumulates
Child support debt owed to custodial families may be composed of unpaid current support, retroactive support, and interest. Arrears owed to the government derive from a mix of government policies that pass costs on to noncustodial parents, including reimbursement for public assistance benefits (paid to mothers), lying-in (medical) costs, interest charging and other fees associated with case processing or genetic testing (Bartfeld, 2003; Roberts, 2001) . 1 Child support order establishment guidelines may also impose support obligations or default orders that low-income parents cannot afford. Some states require monthly minimum support orders that may be high compared to actual income, particularly for NCPs who are incarcerated or unemployed (USDHHS, OIG, 2000a) . For NCPs who fail to appear in court or provide current NCPs may also enter the child support system with high debt due to retroactive support orders, in which NCPs are responsible for the lump sum accumulated between the birth of a child and establishment of a formal support order (USDHHS, OIG, 2000a) . Research suggests a correlation between establishment debt and subsequent non-payment of child support obligations (Cancian, Heinrich & Chung, 2009; USDHHS, OIG, 2000a) .
Furthermore, federal regulations require payment of current support before debt, so that debt and interest may accumulate quickly even for NCPs who pay their current obligations (Hennessey & Venohr, 2000) . earnings information, default orders based on income imputation may be established. These estimates often assume that the NCP is working full-time and impute wages based on a state's minimum wage or an average state or industry wage (Roberts, 2001 ). Research suggests this may later reduce payment compliance (Sorensen, 2004; USDHHS, OIG, 2000a) . Even if established orders are within the means of NCPs, subsequent changes in employment or health status, or periods of incarceration may call for order modification, which rarely occurs automatically and may be difficult for low-income parents to secure due to lack of information or legal representation (Pearson, 2004; Roberts, 2001; Turetsky, 2007) . Retroactive modification of past due child support payments is generally prohibited (Waller & Plotnick, 2001 ).
Other policy factors that may contribute to the accumulation of child support debt include the system's failure to recognize informal custody changes (Pate, 2002; Roberts, 2001 ) and its inability to manage the variety and fluidity of the complex families that require services (Meyer, Cancian & Cook, 2005) . Double-digit interest rates and the charging of other operational fees by states (e.g., for income withholding) also contribute to growing financial burdens for low-income NCPs with debt (Roberts, 2001; USDHHS, OIG, 2000b) . Parents' poor understanding of child support policies may further exacerbate their negative impacts (Collins & Mayer, 2005; Johnson, Levine & Doolittle, 1999; Meyer, Cancian & Nam, 2007; Pate, 2002) .
Analyses of child support arrears suggest that much of the debt is held by poor NCPs. A recent national study found that of the 7 million nonresident fathers who did not pay child support, approximately 36 percent had incomes below the poverty line (Sorensen & Zibman, 2001 ). Another recent study in nine large states found that half of the obligors reported no annual income or earnings of less than $10,000 a year, and the debt owed by these obligors accounted for 70 percent of the total arrears (Sorensen et al., 2007) . 2 Other factors contributing to NCPs' inability to pay child support include poor job skills and employment opportunities, low levels of education, incarceration, unstable health, and a lack of assets to negotiate large, lump sum payments for conventional debt-forgiveness (Cancian & Meyer, 2004; Pate, 2002; Pukstas, Albrecht, Auten, Drew & Dabruzzi, 2004) . Waller and Plotnick (2001) describe a "mismatch" between underlying assumptions of the child support system (e.g., that NCPs are divorced fathers working full-time) and the social and economic realities of many low-income NCPs (e.g., who often have never been married and face multiple barriers to stable employment) that diminishes these parents' willingness and ability to comply with existing policies.
Given the poor economic circumstances of many obligors, researchers have posited that it may be unrealistic to expect additional financial support from these parents (Cancian & Meyer, 2004) .
Simulations for seven states predicted that only 40 percent of the arrears currently owed would likely be collected within the next decade, and that total arrears would grow by at least 50 percent over the same time period (Sorensen et al., 2007) . 3 These results reflect the large proportion of debt owed by poor obligors and low expected collection rates for this population. For example, the authors estimated that obligors with no reported income (owing 40 percent of the arrears), would pay only 16 percent of their debt over 10 years. A California analysis produced even more dire results. Assuming continuation of current trends and no change in policy, simulation models suggested that over 10 years, NCPs would be able to pay only 25 percent of the $14.4 billion in arrears accumulated as of March 2000, and arrears would continue to more than double over the same time period (Sorensen, 2004) .
Consequences of the Build-up of Arrears
The accumulation of child support debt poses problems for custodial families, low-income NCPs, and states (Bartfeld, 2003; Hennessey & Venohr, 2000) . In particular, the recent decline in welfare receipt may have increased the importance of child support payments for low income families (USDHHS, OIG, 2000b) . In 2007, approximately 25 percent of custodial parents and children had incomes below the federal poverty level, and for poor custodial parents who received full payments, child support represented approximately 48 percent of their average income (Grall, 2009 ). On average, however, poor families received only 54 percent of the child support payments they were due, and approximately 31 percent of poverty-level families received no payments at all (Grall, 2009 ). In addition to the consequences triggered by reduced income, some hypothesize that non-payment of child support may also exacerbate conflict between custodial and noncustodial parents and reduce NCPs' contact with children (Bartfeld, 2003) . For NCPs, debt may deter work, as the process of automatic wage withholding may encourage parents to go into the underground economy to avoid cooperating with the formal child support system (Waller & Plotnick, 2001) . 4 NCPs with delinquent payments may also be subject to enforcement actions, including loss of driver's license, liens against vehicles or property, and incarceration that may depress their earning capacity and further exacerbate debt levels (Holzer, Offner & Sorensen, 2005; Pearson, 2004; Turetsky, 2007; Western 2002) . Child support debt is also inherently problematic for states, requiring expenditures for increased collection and enforcement efforts, and lowering state scores on federal performance measures for the share of all arrears cases with payments collected and distributed (Bartfeld, 2003; USDHHS, OIG, 2007) .
Policy Responses to the Child Support Debt Problem: Debt Forgiveness Programs
Some of the policies and programs developed to reduce and manage debt and its negative consequences attempt to address root causes of debt accumulation in a preventative manner (Roberts & Sorensen, 2005; Sorensen et al., 2007) . However, given the large amount of debt already on the books, debt forgiveness strategies (also known as "arrears/debt compromise, debt management, or debt leveraging") are increasingly employed by some counties and states (Bartfeld, 2003; Pearson & Griswold, 2001; Roberts & Sorensen, 2005; USDHHS, OIG, 2007) . Federal law allows states to accept less than full payment of state-owed arrearages and also allows compromise of custodial-owed arrears if both parties agree (USDHHS, ACF, OCSE, 2000) . With this flexibility, state or local courts and/or state child support enforcement (CSE) agencies can accept reduced debt payments or expunge debt altogether in exchange for other desired behaviors, such as on-time payment of current support obligations, or participation in employment or parenting programs. Such policies allow states to reduce the amount of "uncollectible" debt and are motivated by the expectation that low-income obligors will be more willing to participate in the formal child support system and better able to comply with current support orders if relieved of some of their financial burden.
The OCSE does not formally track or monitor debt compromise programs, or issue formal guidelines for them; however, it has included information about such programs in its annual
Compendium of Best Practices (USDHHS, OIG, 2007) . Previous reviews have identified small-scale or pilot debt-forgiveness programs operating in a number of states, primarily at the county level (Bartfeld, 2003; Hennessey & Venohr, 2000; Pearson & Griswold, 2001) , and a recent report by the (USDHHS, OIG, 2007) . 6 The states selected were California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. 7 Although originally designed as a randomized controlled trial, some noncustodial parents assigned to treatment groups chose not to enroll. Enrollees had significantly higher incomes and lower monthly child support obligations, factors found to be predictive of program success (Pukstas et al., 2004 NCPs to continue in the program for up to two years, unless they failed to make a current support payment in two consecutive quarters.
To ensure that the size of the pilot program would be manageable, the eligible population was restricted to NCPs with total debt burdens of at least $2,000 owed to the state or the family on at least one child support case (excluding foster care, kinship, and interstate cases) and who had a recent history of non-payment, defined as: (a) no payment on current support in the past three months; (b) current support paid in less than 6 of last 12 months; or (c) paid less than one half of annual amount owed in current support over the past 12 months. In advance of the start of the pilot, the sample frame was identified by applying these criteria to NCPs attached to Racine County IV-D cases open at the end of December 2004 (using Bureau of Child Support (BCS) administrative data). All NCPs (and their IV-D cases) in the eligible sample frame (approximately 5,000 cases) were randomly assigned to the control or experimental group using the last two digits of NCPs' social security numbers; 7 of every 10 cases were assigned experimental status prior to the program roll-out. New IV-D cases were similarly randomly assigned to the control or experimental groups each quarter if they met eligibility requirements.
Eligible NCPs had to go through a number of steps before enrolling and receiving debt reduction (see Figure 1 ). 10 Because Families Forward was a new program, NCPs first had to learn of its existence. IRP mailed letters of invitation to eligible NCPs (both in the experimental and control group) and their CPs, and distributed posters and brochures at retail, government, and service provider locations in Racine County. In Steps 2 and 3, NCPs had to contact the child support agency to confirm their eligibility and express their willingness to participate; control cases were informed at Step 2 that they did not qualify for program participation at this time. An experimental NCP looking to receive reduction on state-owed debt then had to wait for the child support agency to generate and mail a stipulation agreement outlining the terms of the debt forgiveness. An NCP also looking to receive reduction on family-owed debt faced additional steps. First (Step 4A), the NCP had to contact the CP and describe the program.
11 If the CP agreed to participate in the program, he or she had to communicate that willingness to the child support agency (Step 4B). Both parties then had to wait for the child support agency to generate and mail the stipulation agreements (Step 4C). Upon receiving the stipulation agreement(s), the NCP (and CP) had to sign and return the forms to the agency (Step 5).
Only then did the agency formally enroll the NCP and enable him or her to receive debt reduction, which would typically begin in the next quarter (Step 6).
In practice, these steps to enrollment were sometimes difficult to navigate, and many eligible, experimental NCPs failed to complete the process. Figure 1 also illustrates the variety of "exit points"
at which NCPs could fall out of the enrollment process. The end result was a low take-up rate, an issue we further discuss below.
Analytic Sample and Data
The sample Participation in the Families Forward program among the "willing experimentals" was low;
only 120 (32 percent) of these 378 NCPs successfully enrolled. Of these 120 participants, nearly three-quarters (88) received forgiveness on state-owed arrears only, 25 received forgiveness on familyowed arrears only, and 7 received forgiveness on both state-and family-owed arrears. A follow-up survey of NCPs who expressed an interest in Families Forward (described in Appendix A) suggests at least two explanations for the low level of participation among willing experimentals. First, CP cooperation was a serious obstacle to enrollment for some NCPs with CP-owed debt (Exit Points 4A
and 4B in Figure 1 ). Of 32 surveyed NCPs who reported contacting the CP about Families Forward, over 40 percent said that the CP was "not at all interested" in participating in the program. 12 Second, some NCPs may not have followed through with the entire enrollment process, mistakenly thinking that they had already been enrolled (Exit Point 5 in Figure 1 ). Among the survey respondents, 35
willing experimentals had failed to enroll by the time of their survey, and four mistakenly reported that they were enrolled.
13
The Kids Information Data System (KIDS), used by the State of Wisconsin Bureau of Child Support for tracking child support orders and payments, provides the primary data for the impact analysis. The KIDS data contain information on child support orders, payments, receipts and arrearages; the method of payment (wage withholding, tax intercepts) and destination of the payment (custodial parent, state); and demographic information about the parents and children in the cases (including birth dates, residential location of both parents, and dates of marriage, divorce, and paternity establishment). These data were merged with Unemployment I nsur ance (UI ) W age R ecor d F iles, which track the wages of workers eligible for state unemployment insurance. 14 Measures were constructed with these data to control for the employment and earnings histories of parents, in addition to other characteristics of parents and children involved in the child support cases, in nonexperimentally estimating program impacts.
The primary outcome measures in this study, constructed from the KIDS data, include: (1) 
ST UDY M E T H ODS
We employ both experimental and nonexperimental methods in evaluating the Families Forward program impacts. The primary advantage of an experimental approach to evaluation that randomly assigns participation in the intervention is that it assures that participation in the intervention is the only factor that differs between those in the treatment group and those excluded from participating (the control group). Our analysis confirmed that the experimental NCPs who were invited to enroll and indicated their willingness to participate were statistically equivalent to those randomly assigned to the control group who also indicated their willingness to participate. For this "intent to treat" sample, we use experimental methods to calculate the Families Forward program impacts.
However, contrary to the program designers' intent, all willing NCPs with experimental status did not complete all steps to enroll in the Families Forward program, and those who did enroll were not statistically equivalent to willing NCPs assigned to the control group. Thus, we are not able to address with experimental methods the policy question: What was the impact of the Families Forward program on those who received the treatment? That is, calculating average differences in outcomes between actual participants and control group members will not identify the impact of "the treatment on the treated."
Fortunately, the use of random assignment in the Families Forward program evaluation also facilitates the application of rigorous nonexperimental evaluation methods, where random assignment status is used as an instrument for participation in estimating program impacts. Assuming that randomization does not influence program outcomes, we use propensity score (differences-indifferences) matching and include random assignment to treatment as an exogenous predictor variable in the first-stage estimation of the probability of program participation. We also employ nearestneighbor matching with bias adjustment as an alternative matching procedure. As a sensitivity test, we estimated a standard instrumental variables (IV) model of program impacts, and we also applied the 
The first two columns of Table 1 show that with regard to individual characteristics and key measures of interest in this study-total household debt balances and state debt balances, and recent payment histories at the start of the program-the 378 willing experimental NCPs who contacted Racine County to sign up for the Families Forward program were statistically equivalent to the 153 control group members who also expressed an interest in participating but were not allowed to enroll due to their "control" status. In other words, the experimental design worked for the "intent to treat" group, and we calculate program impacts for the group of NCPs who expressed their interest in participating as the average difference in outcomes between the 378 experimental NCPs and the 153 control group members.
Nonexperimental Methods
The third column in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on actual participants in the pilot program.
Comparing actual participants with NCPs assigned to the control group, statistically significant differences are evident for a few demographic characteristics (percent white, never married) and for key characteristics concerning the program intervention (household and state debt balances, and payments in the quarter prior to program start). As random assignments to the treatment and control groups were made prior to the mailing of invitations to participate in Families Forward, we are not able to make the same assumption that participation 15 in the program (which we will call D′) is independent of factors influencing Y 0 .
In applying matching methods, we invoke the conditional independence assumption, which implies that after controlling for observable characteristics (X), a person's actual treatment status is not related to what his or her outcome would have been in the absence of treatment.
The validity of this assumption depends largely on the set of variables (X) available for the estimation and how the comparison group is chosen. We expect that there may be some unmeasured factors that influence program participation; what is important is that participation not be predictive of the outcome that would have occurred without the program. That is, conditional on measured characteristics, there should be no unmeasured factors that affect both participation and relevant nonparticipant outcomes. If this assumption is valid, the effect of the program on participants conditional on X can be written as:
15 Participation in the Families Forward program is defined by the signing of a stipulation agreement that formally enrolls the noncustodial participant, stops interest charging on debt, and begins providing credit toward debt based on current support payments made.
All regression and matching adjustment methods make this same assumption, although they differ in the methods used to estimate E(Y 1 | D′=1, X) and E(Y 0 | D′=0, X).
Propensity score matching. The common application of matching we use, propensity score matching (PSM), is a two-step process in which we first estimate the probability of participation based on the conditioning variables. By generating predicted probabilities of participation (i.e., propensity scores), we reduce the matching process to a one-dimensional problem of comparing treated and untreated NCPs with similar propensity scores (rather than requiring matches on all of the X variables).
In the combined sample of participants and comparison group members, let P(X) be the probability that an individual with characteristics X is a participant. If participants and comparison group members have the same P(X), the distribution of X across these groups will be the same (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) :
and individual cases can be compared on the basis of their propensity scores alone. We estimate:
where
is the expectation across all values of X for participants. A probit function is used in estimating the first-stage model that produces the propensity scores P(X).
In one PSM estimation strategy, we include all eligible NCPs who expressed an interest in participating in Families Forward, whether assigned to treatment or control status. As only one-third of eligible NCPs with experimental status participated, we use random assignment to treatment as an exogenous predictor variable in this model. As expected, random assignment to the experimental group is the most influential predictor of participation in Families Forward. Other statistically significant predictors of NCPs' participation included demographic characteristics (age, race), earnings in the year prior to program start, and state debt balance and child support payment frequency in the month/quarter prior to program start (see Appendix B). As a sensitivity test, we also estimated the PSM models on the subsample that included only participants (n=120) and controls (n=153), that is, excluding the experimental NCPs who did not participate. Differences in the results (discussed below)
were negligible.
The propensity score matching technique that we use to adjust for selective differences between the Families Forward participants and nonparticipants in the second stage model is among the more rigorous available. Because several of the outcome variables are defined as the difference between a pre-program and later period measure for each individual, we are able to use a panel form of the matching estimator ("difference-in-differences" matching) that allows for time-invariant, unobserved differences between participants and nonparticipants to be present without biasing estimates of program impacts. The particular matching technique we apply, radius matching, specifies a "caliper"
or maximum propensity score distance by which a match can be made. It uses not only the nearest neighbor within each caliper, but all comparison cases within the caliper (based on the specified distance), and the common support condition is imposed to exclude poor matches from the analysis.
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping procedures.
We also employ a nearest-neighbor matching procedure with bias adjustment, which was recently developed in response to concerns first articulated by Abadie and Imbens (2002) , that even after removing the conditional bias, matching estimators with a fixed number of matches may not reach the semiparametric efficiency bound for average treatment effects. Their approach implements a bias-correction that removes the conditional bias asymptotically (Abadie et al., 2004) . We assess the sensitivity of our results to the choice of matching estimator.
Instrumental variables regression and Bloom adjustment. Primarily as another sensitivity test,
we also estimated instrumental variables (IV) models of program effects. We expect the random assignment status variable to satisfy the two key properties of a good instrumental variable; it is highly correlated with participation in Families Forward (instrument relevance), but we also assume that it is not correlated with any unobserved factors that affect the outcome variables (instrument exogeneity).
We employ a standard two-stage least squares IV approach in estimating each of the program outcomes described earlier.
The Bloom adjustment recognizes that the average "intent to treat" impact estimate is actually a mix of treatment effects for participants and null effects for nonparticipants. It employs a simple correction to experimental estimates-it allocates the difference between a given outcome for experimental and control group members to the fraction of experimental cases that received treatment (by dividing the experimental impact estimate by the fraction of participants). We apply this relatively rudimentary correction to the experimental and IV model estimates (again as a sensitivity test).
Multilevel longitudinal modeling.
As briefly noted above, we employ multilevel growth curve models (Singer & Willett, 2003 ) that allow us to examine changes over time (51 months) in the outcome variables and their relationship to the timing of important events, such as the expression of interest and enrollment in the program, while controlling for other time-varying and stable
characteristics. An advantage of this modeling approach is that both the number of measurement occasions and their timing may vary across individuals and need not be balanced in the sample.
Individuals invited to participate in the Families Forward program, for example, responded to this opportunity over a period of 33 months, so that the timing of a key event (their first contact to express their willingness to participate) varied considerably across those included in this study. As the timing of this event determines the pre-intervention and post-intervention periods, it is important to accurately capture this in the modeling of individual outcomes over time. We also assume that NCPs' responses to these events are on the same temporal cycle as everything else that might affect patterns in the program outcomes (and for which we do not have controls in the model).
Multilevel methods have no special capacity in solving the causal inference problem, and as there are numerous alternative approaches to model specification, it is important to have a strong conceptual justification for the models estimated (Steele, 2007) . Our choice of model specification is informed largely by our contextual knowledge of child support and related programs, gained through the literature and our experience in the implementation of the Families Forward Program. For example, we know that with state interest charges on debt, the debt balances of most NCPs in our sample are growing over time, but as participation in Families Forward stops interest charging, we expect that there may be a change in this growth rate for participants. In addition, given the new incentives offered by the program to encourage NCPs to pay more support, we expect that there may be a noticeable increase in the amount that they are paying once enrolled (with possible corresponding declines in debt balances). As participating and nonparticipating NCPs are compared beginning at the point at which they first make contact to express an interest in enrolling, we also anticipate that there might be lags in the timing of the response to these new incentives, particularly if prospective participants hold off on making any (or bigger) payments until they are enrolled and getting extra credit toward their debt for each dollar paid. Finally, we anticipate possible drop-offs in payments over time, as participants exhaust financial reserves or reach the end of program participation (limited to two years).
In the multilevel models we estimate, Y ti is the response at measurement occasion t (t=1,…,T i )
for individual i (i=1,…,n). At level one, we use time trend and indicator variables to model outcomes using a piecewise linear function (that is, consisting of two or more regression lines or "pieces" in which the slope of the function is not constant) to account for the effects of time in months (nested within individual participants). We model the average slope in pre-and post-program (first contact)
periods (π 1i and π 2i ) with time trend variables, and we use several indicator variables to capture shifts (increments or decrements) in outcomes (π 3i to π 5i ) at specific times after the first contact and the threemonth periods (March-May) each year when tax returns are typically received (π 6i to π 8i ) 16 :
Y ti = π 0i + π 1i Time_pre ti + π 2i Time_post ti + π 3i 1st3mos_post ti + π 4i 2nd3mos_post ti + π 5i 7plusmos_post ti + π 6i taxtime05 ti + π 7i taxtime06 ti + π 8i taxtime07 ti + r ti.
Note that the tax time indicators will be the same calendar time periods for all individuals in the sample, while calendar time of the other indicators will differ across individuals according to the timing of their first contact to express an interest in Families Forward.
In level two of the model, the intercept (π 0i , where time=0, i.e., initial status) from the level one model is specified as random and a function of individual characteristics (demographic, number of children, monthly earnings, whether a current support order is in effect, and their cohort as defined by timing of first contact) and treatment status (d i =1 for participants):
The time trend (growth rate) variables and indicators for capturing post-contact shifts (π 1i to π 5i ) are also specified as random and a function of treatment status, for example:
and correspondingly for π 2i to π 5i, , where the left subscript on the β coefficients indicates the level-one parameter, and the right subscript denotes the level-two parameter. The random effects equations (π 1i
to π 5i ) model the effects of the program on the outcome trajectories of participants (relative to those who were eligible and expressed an interest in the program but did not participate); π 6i to π 8i are modeled as fixed effects.
These level one and level two models are estimated simultaneously, with an autoregressive error structure (within-person error covariance) of lag one, AR(1). The choice of error structure imposed on the model residuals should correspond to the data, accounting for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity as necessary. We tested a standard (variance components) specification, as well as six other error covariance structures that other researchers (Singer and Willett, 2003) have found most useful (unstructured, compound symmetric, heterogeneous compound symmetric, autoregressive, heterogeneous autoregressive and Toeplitz). Comparing goodness-of-fit statistics across models, we concluded that the AR(1) structure was the best fit. Table 2 presents Comparing the 378 experimental cases who expressed an interest in participating (the "intent to treat" group) with the controls (column 1), we see that there are no statistically significant differences in outcomes between these two groups. Thus, the strict experimental comparison-the difference in outcome values between all willing experimental NCPs and all willing controls-does not show any statistically significant impacts of the Families Forward Program. In general, though, the outcome patterns are in the expected direction, with willing experimental NCPs paying more monthly child support on average, making more frequent payments, and reducing their state debt balances.
ANALYSIS FINDINGS
Comparing only the 32 percent of the experimental NCPs who were actually getting credit toward their debt through participation in Families Forward with the control group (and not adjusting for differences in their individual characteristics), this pattern of effects is more pronounced in terms of magnitude and/or statistical significance (see column 2 in Table 2 ).
The next four columns of results present the nonexperimental estimates of "treatment on the treated" program effects that adjust for pre-intervention differences between actual participants and comparison group members. Column 3 shows the estimated effects from propensity score matching; column 4 from nearest neighbor matching analyses, and column 5 using the subsample that includes only the 120 participants and 153 control group members (excluding willing experimental NCPs who did not enroll). After matching, the estimated impacts are considerably larger, and the differences (relative to PSM) that will not affect the statistical significance of the impact estimates, and the IV and PSM approaches to adjusting for differences in the characteristics of actual participants and comparison NCPs also differ, so we do not expect exact correspondence in results across these methods.
These nonexperimental approaches to impact estimation may still be lacking, however, in that The results of the multilevel longitudinal models for four outcomes-average monthly payment made, the probability of making a payment in a given month, state-owed debt balance and household debt balance-are presented in Table 3 . The key parameters of interest in this table of estimates (shown in bold) are the indicator for the start of the period following an NCP's expression of interest in the program (identifying post-contact months) and the post-contact growth rate for participants, representing the slope differential between participants and nonparticipants after they expressed an interest in participating in Families Forward. Also of interest are the indicators that capture shifts in outcomes at specific times after the first contact for participants relative to nonparticipants. These include an indicator variable for the first three months after NCPs indicated a willingness to participate (and indicators for the second three months and six months post-contact), which are intended to model behavioral responses related to the administrative delays in the onset of participation following the first contact with the child support agency. Table 3 also shows the coefficient estimates for stable and time-varying covariates in these models, as well as for other time trend and indicator variables. Included among these are indicators for "cohorts"-approximately six month periods during which first contacts were made by NCPs in the sample-although these variables interacted with participation are not statistically significant. Where statistically significant, the control variables predict outcomes in the expected direction: older NCPs, those with more children, and those with a current support order owe more debt but also pay more monthly; NCPs with higher prior earnings and higher monthly earnings pay more monthly, and the former also owe less to the household; white NCPs pay more monthly and owe less to the state; and all NCPs pay significantly more ($56-78 per month) in the months of March, April and May each year when tax credits/returns typically arrive.
Looking at the key, statistically significant findings of interest for monthly payments made (column 1, Table 3 ), the coefficient on the post-contact period indicator for participants suggests that across all months following their expression of interest in the program, on average, participants pay $114 more per month toward their current support and/or debt owed than NCPs who are not participating in Families Forward.. The post-contact growth rate for participants is negative, however, with the coefficient suggesting that the additional amount they pay declines by approximately $4 per month in the months after first contact. Participants also pay an estimated $137 less on average in the first three months post-contact than nonparticipants, which is consistent with what we know from talking to program administrators and enrollees about how the NCPs wait until a stipulation is signed to begin making payments and getting credit toward their debt. A simpler specification fit better for the model estimating the probability that an NCP made a payment in a given month (see column 2, Table 3 ), and the findings show that on average, participants are 8.3 percent more likely than nonparticipants to make a payment each month in the post-contact period.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 show the multilevel model results for changes in state and household debt balances over the period of study. The coefficients on the trend variables for preand post-contact growth rates show that for all NCPs, both state-owed and CP-owed debt are growing over time. However, for Families Forward participants, the post-contact trend in state-owed balances is negative and statistically significant, showing that the state-owed debt of program participants is declining by about $101 per month, on average, following the month in which they made contact to express their interest in the program. Participants' post-contact growth rate for CP-owed debt is in the direction expected, but it is not statistically significant. This is not entirely surprising, as so few participating NCPs (32) were receiving any credit toward reducting their CP-owed debt.
In general, we view the nonexperimental findings from the alternative approaches to estimation as fairly comparable. The matching and multilevel models identified statistically significant impacts of the Families Forward program in increasing NCPs' payments toward current support and arrears, in increasing the frequency or probability of payment over the post-intervention period, and in reducing state-owed debt balances. More specifically, as the majority of program participants had at least 32 post-contact months that we were able to observe, the finding that state-owed debt balances are declining by an average of $101 is largely consistent with the matching estimates showing that participant state debt balances declined by $3,200-3,800 more than state debt balances of nonparticipants in the post-contact period. And as the decline in state balances is mechanically related to the payments made toward debt and current support, it is not surprising that the average increase in payments by participating NCPs ($114 per month) also approaches this total over 32 months, taking into account the initial decline in the three months after first contact and the negative post-contact growth rate, (where over time, the additional amount they pay decreases by about $4 per month). As described earlier, the moderation in increases in payments by participating NCPs over time is expected, as some will have completed their two years of time in the program, and others may deplete their financial reserves for making additional payments to get credit toward their debt. 17 Finally, the nonexperimental analyses show no statistically significant effects of program participation on changes in household debt balances, which we expected given that only about 25 percent of participants were able to secure stipulation agreements signed by the CP to allow forgiveness of CP-owed arrears.
17 Survey results also suggest that some NCPs were disappointed in the results of the program after enrolling and may have subsequently moderated their payments. Among 30 surveyed NCPs who reported participating in the program, 17 said that Families Forward had helped them reduce their debt less than they had expected. While some of this disappointment may be attributable to unreasonably high expectations for the program's capacity to reduce debt, or to low levels of payment (and thus low levels of debt reduction), implementation shortcomings may also have played a role.
Overall, we argue that the rigor of the estimators (using a rich set of covariates and a randomization device to nonexperimentally adjust for differences in participants and nonparticipants), the balancing test results, and the relatively long period of observation (i.e., more than four years) call for considerable confidence in the nonexperimental findings.
We also conducted some simple, case-by-case analyses to examine how individual debt balances changed over the course of the program for participating NCPs. $18,474 reduced to $554; $17,755 to $0; $14,410 to $0; $13,417 to $4,073; $11,114 to $0; and $10,266 to $1,141. The largest household debt balance reductions included one greater than $60,000 and another more than $40,000. 18 These substantial reductions in debt balances are likewise encouraging about the potential of Families Forward program to reduce individual and state child support debts.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For the NCPs who participated in the Families Forward pilot program, results were promising.
Comparisons of participating NCPs to non-participants using propensity score matching and multilevel longitudinal methods suggested important effects of the program: participants made larger child support payments, paid them more frequently, and reduced their state-owed debt balances. However, it is possible that these results, which statistically adjust for the selective nature of program take-up, overstate the potential to increase child support payments and reduce arrears across the population of NCPs with poor payment histories. The experimental estimates, which combine both treatment effects for participants and null effects for the 68 percent of experimental cases who did not participate, showed no statistically significant effects. If participation remains low in future implementations of the program, as has been the experience in other debt forgiveness programs, then the vast majority of NCPs would be unaffected by the program.
On the other hand, low take-up is a problem common to many important social program interventions. A MDRC survey (Wallace, 2002) reported that relatively small percentages of eligible, low-income families avail themselves to work supports such as education and training (23 percent) and food stamps (43 percent), and Bansak and Raphael (2006) estimated that the overall take-up rate among eligibles for the State Children's Health Insurance Program is just 10 percent. Studies of housing programs have shown that among the 77 classes of interventions, take-up rates never rise above 25 percent, and take-up rates are lowest among the poorest eligible households (Currie, 2006 described several reasons why this might be more effective than relying on the parents to contact each other: 1) they often did not have updated contact information for the other parent, 2) parents who had antagonistic relationships were concerned about heightening conflict, and 3) parents indicated that they had a hard time explaining the details of the program to the other parent. If CP participation can be increased, the incentives for NCPs to make payments will likewise increase (as they receive additional credits for payments) and more NCPs (with family-owed debt) will enroll in the program.
Another approach to increasing NCP participation is to improve communications with NCPs, both during and after the enrollment process. Survey results showed that participants had difficulty understanding if they were enrolled in Families Forward and whether it was working to reduce their arrears. These challenges likely contributed to some NCPs expressing disappointment in the program.
For a conditional debt reduction program to maximize its impact, NCPs must be able to easily see how their payments link to reductions in their arrears. (Brodkin, 2007) . For these reasons, we are confident that the non-experimental estimates of program effects in this study are valid for informing future policy decisions that could contribute importantly to reducing the persistent, high levels of child support debt in the United States. Statistically significant differences at p < 0.05 are shown in bold. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and the Bloom-adjusted program impact estimates are presented in a separate row in italics. NCPs responded to letters of invitation by calling to schedule a telephone survey, and 97 of these completed a survey. 22 Overall, 30 percent of the 327 NCPs in the eligible sample frame completed a survey.
We used administrative data from KIDS and UI wage data to compare the surveyed NCPs with the remaining NCPs in the analytic sample. T-tests of differences in means showed no systematic differences across the groups in terms of current support orders, family-owed debt balances, stateowed debt balances, amount of state-or family-owed debt reduction, total child support payments, or
wages. There were also no differences across groups in terms of sex, race, or group assignment (treatment versus control). Survey respondents are therefore representative of the larger analytic sample on these important variables. 21 The survey was designed to reference one specific IV-D child support case per NCP. Yet, 116 of the 394 NCPs had multiple cases. The rules used to select one focal case for each NCP with multiple cases prioritized cases in which a CP had enrolled with the NCP and cases with higher debt balances. 22 We offered $25 for completing a survey during the first six months of the invitation process and increased the compensation to $35 after the first six months in an attempt increase the incentive to participate in the survey. 
